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Abstract 
 
We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters’ participation is often among the 
desiderata by the election designer. We show that with a participation quorum, i.e. a threshold on 
the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept, the status quo may be kept 
in situations where the planner would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner 
prefers the status quo. On the other hand, using an approval quorum, i.e. a threshold on the 
number of voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the status quo is kept, we 
show that those drawbacks of participation quorums are avoided. Moreover, an electoral system 
with approval quorum performs better than one with participation quorum even when the planner 
wishes to implement the corresponding participation quorum social choice function. 
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1 Introduction
Direct democracy, in the form of referenda and initiatives, are used in many
countries for decision making. Beside Switzerland and the United States,
their use has spread out to many European countries and Australia.1 As
mentioned by Casella and Gelman (2008), in US states the number of refer-
enda has increased in every decade since 1970, at an average rate of seventy
per cent per decade.
In all referendum or initiative electoral rules, there is some form of mini-
mum (absolute or relative) support requirement. In some cases (take Switzer-
land for example) there is a minimum number of signatures to put an ini-
tiative to vote, but there is no minimum turnout requirement in the actual
vote; in contrast, in many other cases there is also an additional “quorum”
requirement at the time of the vote. Quorums are a simple way of protecting
the status quo. The subset of voters who proposed the reform (or lobbyists)
have had the time to think of it and to measure the gain they can draw from
the reform. It may be the case that voters who are currently indifferent be-
tween the status quo and the reform would prefer the status quo if they were
better informed or if the cost of voting were smaller. As stated in Qvortrup
(2002), the rationale for a turnout requirement is that “a low turnout in
referendums is seen as a threat to their legitimacy”.2
Legitimacy, however, may have multiple meanings: the two most fre-
quently used types of legitimacy turnout requirements are the so called “par-
ticipation quorum” and “approval quorum.” When a participation quorum is
imposed, an electoral outcome is considered legitimate if enough voters turn
out, hence legitimacy is due to a sufficiently large set of citizens who care
enough and have clear enough preferences. On the other hand, the approval
quorum is a minimum required number of votes in support of the proposal,
and hence legitimacy is in terms of a minimal strength of the absolute sup-
port for a reform, regardless of whether the rest of the population care or
not or whether they have clear preferences or not.3
1See e.g. Matsusaka (2005a, 2005b) for an account of the increasing use of direct
democracy around the world.
2See also LeDuc (2003) for a discussion of the fear to have a minority of the population
prevail over a passive majority.
3Among the examples of participation quorums used in reality, the Italian example is
the most used, even if similar quorums exist in other countries. For the approval quorum
type of rules, on the other hand, Germany is the most recognized example. See Corte-Real
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In this paper, we aim to show the superiority of approval over participa-
tion quorums in the following sense: when an absolute minimum approval
for the reform is part of the desiderata of a social planner, the approval
quorum rules do implement efficiently those social preferences; but the same
is not true for a social planner whose legitimacy concerns are in terms of
participation: participation based social preferences are not well served by
participation quorum rules. Moreover, an approval quorum dominates a par-
ticipation quorum because it does better even in the latter “territory,” i.e.
leading to outcomes that are closer to what is recommended by social objec-
tives defined in terms of participation.
The large incentive-to-abstain problem with a high participation quorum
has already been discussed in other papers, especially with reference to Italian
experiences.4 We study the consequences of this incentive to abstain when
voters are strategic and there is some population uncertainty, that is, the
number of voters actually casting their ballot is a random variable. We
confirm that it is rational for supporters of the status quo to abstain, with
two potential types of “mistakes:” first, as it is well-known, there are profiles
of voters’ preferences under which the status quo is kept even though the
majority of citizens would have favored the reform. In addition, surprisingly,
there are other profiles of preferences in which the reform is passed even
and Pereira (2004) for a description of the various types of turnout requirements used in
the world and for an axiomatic discussion.
4In Italian politics, from 1996 until 2011, all popular referenda have failed because of
low voter turnout (30% or lower). More specifically, referenda in 1997 (seven bills, various
topics including hunting, abolishing agrarian ministry, and conscientious objectors), 1999
(elimination of PR), 2000 (seven bills, dealing with electoral law, unions, and judges), 2003
(rehiring illegally fired workers and electricity on private property), 2005 (stem cells and
IVF), 2009 (electoral law) all failed. The clearest case of strategic abstension was for the
2005 referendum: overall turnout was only 24-26%, and is thought to be low due to encour-
agement from Vatican and Catholic bishops to abstain. For the four initiatives, of those
voting approximately 88% were for eliminating research limitations and 78% for allowing
IVF. In 2009 the question was on eliminating connection between lists and giving majority
prize to coalition of lists in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, respectively. Turnout was
23% for both (and of those voters, 22% voted against); and for eliminating the ability of a
candidate to stand for election in more than one constituency, turnout was 23% (with
13% voting against). See http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/06/italys-
referendums. See also Herrera and Mattozzi (2010), Hizen and Shinmyo (2010), and
Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhaes (2010a), who find evidence from cross country data from
1970 to 2007. See also Zwart (2009) for a discussion of how ”high” a participation quorum
should be, conditional on having chosen to have one.
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though the majority is in favor of the status quo.5
With an approval quorum, which requires a minimum number of votes in
favor of the reform in order to pass it (on top, of course, of a majority of votes
casted), all the incentives to abstain disappear. More precisely, we show that
sincere voting is always rational and is the only rational way of voting under
this type of rules. Consequently, approval quorum rules implement approval
based social preferences. The same factor, namely the huge difference in
terms of incentives to abstain between the two quorum rules, is responsible for
making an approval quorum a better way of implementing even participation
based social preferences.
Using a participation quorum there exist bad equilibria with low partici-
pation, often voluntarily induced by strategic leaders who want to inhibit an
effective use of direct democracy. On the other hand, with an approval quo-
rum no equilibrium exists without sincere behavior and efficient aggregation
of preferences or information. These comparative results hold when we view
the elections as preference aggregation devices as well as when we view them
as information aggregation devices, hence the results are very robust if one
accepts the methodological focus on rational individual strategic voting.6
Studying strategic voting in large elections raises well known difficulties:
any voting profile such that no voter is pivotal for the outcome of the elec-
tion is an equilibrium, as no voter can profitably deviate. As a consequence,
the set of Nash equilibria is large. It is therefore impossible to explain the
regularities one observes in large elections, including the ones about large
abstention in referendum with quorums, using standard assumptions. A
long series of models have provided solutions to this problem, all introducing
some ingredients that make some pivotal probabilities always positive. Such
ingredients can be uncertainty about preferences of other voters (see e.g.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)), perceived probabilities of tie events (see
5See Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhaes (2010b) for a different analysis of this second type
of mistake.
6If one believes that elections should be studied focusing on parties’ “mobilization”
efforts rather than on individual strategic voting, then the key difference between approval
and participation quorums that we emphasize becomes undiscernable. This is why Herrera
and Mattozzi (2010), using a mobilization model, found no substantial difference between
participation and approval quorums, even if they find that parties may face the two kinds
of mistakes that we describe above. Similarly, the two quorum rules are also difficult to
compare when using ethical voting models like Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) or Coate
and Conlin (2004), because in ethical voting models voters (if guided by the same type of
group utilitarianism) are assumed to coordinate as if they were mobilized by a leader.
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e.g. Myerson and Weber (1993)), or uncertainty about the actual number of
voters. This population uncertainty has been modeled in two ways. Some-
times it is assumed that the number of players is fixed but each player has
a fixed probability of not participating in the election, so that the number
of actual voters is distributed according to some binomial distribution (see
e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and Laslier (2009)). Alternatively,
the number of players is assumed to be Poisson distributed (see e.g. Fed-
dersen and Pesendorfer (1999) and Myerson (2000)). We follow the latter
assumption.
Myerson (1999) proved that such Poisson games are characterized by two
properties: action independence, implying that the numbers of voters of each
type choosing any action are independently distributed; and environmental
equivalence, implying that a player of any type considers a probability dis-
tribution of types of the other players identical to the one for the game
itself. These two properties will be used below and make the analysis of the
voting game quite simple. The key mechanism we highlight thanks to the
assumption of population uncertainty works as follows. Under a participa-
tion quorum, a status quo supporter always faces the dilemma that her vote
may be pivotal in reaching the quorum at the benefit of the reform, or her
vote may be pivotal in favor of the status quo if one vote is needed to obtain
a majority against the reform. We prove that the former tie event is more
likely than the latter one even if the quorum is expected to be reached.
Several authors have recently used Myerson’s theory of large Poisson
games to analyze strategic voting in large elections. Though some authors
have used it for positive objectives (see e.g. Castanheira (2003), Herrera,
Morelli and Palfrey (2012) and Bouton (2009)), that theory has mainly been
used to discuss voting rules normatively (see, for instance, Myerson (1998,
2002), Bouton and Castanheira (2009), and Goertz and Maniquet (2010)).
Our contribution is mainly normative and the clear conclusion we draw is
that approval quorum should be preferred to participation quorums.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic
model, in which there is population uncertainty but no individual information
problem, in the sense that each citizen knows exactly what alternative would
be best for her. Section 3 contains the analysis of the model and Section 4
highlights the main result. In Section 5 we extend our result to the case in
which there are independent citizens whose preferences for reform or status
quo depend on the state of Nature, which is uncertain. In Section 6 we
conclude with some brief remarks. All technical proofs are in the appendix.
5
2 Model
An electorate is called to decide whether to reform a status quo policy or not.
The real voting population is uncertain. We assume it is Poisson distributed,
with expected size n. For sufficiently large n, the Poisson distribution is close
to the binomial one, that is, our assumption is close to assuming that each
citizen in a population of size n
p
has an independent probability p of being
selected by nature to go to vote.
A fraction θS of citizens is realized to strictly prefer the status quo, a
fraction θR have opposite preferences, and the remaining fraction of citizens
are indifferent between the two options. Consequently, the number of actual
citizens preferring S to R (resp., R to S) is Poisson distributed with expected
value θSn (resp., θRn), with θS + θR ≤ 1.
2.1 Conservative Social Preferences
The social planner does not know the exact distribution of preferences and
is assumed to be biased in favor of the status quo. Hence her objective is to
design rules that would make reforms pass only when the support for such
reforms is “sufficiently clear” or “sufficiently strong.”. There are at least two
different “incarnations” of this conservative bias:7
1. Participation Quorum Social Preferences (PQSP): R is the socially pre-
ferred outcome if and only if the realized numbers of supporters are
θSn < θRn and the total number of agents with strict preferences is
above some threshold, (θS + θR)n ≥ qn, for some q ∈ [0, 1] – see figure
1;
2. Approval Quorum Social Preferences (AQSP): R is the socially pre-
ferred outcome if and only if θSn < θRn and there is a sufficiently large
absolute number of supporters of the reform, i.e., θRn ≥ q̂n, for some
q̂ ∈ [0, 1] – see figure 2.8
7We define social preferences in terms of expected vote shares. We could have defined
them in terms of actual vote shares. Given that we concentrate on equilibria in sufficiently
large populations, the difference between the two, that is, the probability that the recom-
mendation of social preferences based on expected shares differs from that based on actual
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Figure 1: participation quorum social preferences
In summary, sufficiently clear can relate to the number of people who
manifest their strict preferences or to the absolute support for the reform.
Both these social preferences reflect a conservative bias. The difference is
that the first type of preferences imposes that enough people in the electorate
should have clear (strict) preferences; the second type of social preferences
instead just require a minimum dimension of the class of people demand-
ing the reform, regardless of the intensity of preferences of the rest of the
population.
To clarify the logic behind these two types of social preferences, consider
the example of q = 0.5 and qˆ = 0.25. If only 30 percent of the population
eligible to vote has a strict preference but 99 percent of such voters are in favor
of the reform, the preference for the reform would be considered sufficiently
clear by a planner focused on the minimal absolute support requirement of
shares, is negligible.
8The quorums are expressed here in terms of absolute numbers of voters. They could
not be expressed in fraction terms, as our population is potentially unbounded, due to
our assumption of a Poisson distribution. This distribution, however, can be viewed as
an approximation of a binomial distribution, where our n parameter corresponds to the
expected number of interested citizens, pN , where N would be the actual size of the
population and p the common probability of being called (by nature) to go to vote. With
this interpretation, the quorums, in terms of a fraction of N , are pq and pq̂.
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Figure 2: q̂−approval quorum social preferences
AQSP, whereas the presence of 70 percent of indifferent citizens would induce
the planner with PQSP to consider the status quo as the preferred option
even though 99 percent of the voters with strict preferences are for the reform.
Rather than disputing which of these types of social preferences are the most
reasonable, we simply notice that both seem to exist in reality9 and move to
the evaluation of the way in which they are and/or should be implemented.
2.2 Voting Rules
What electoral rules should a planner design, as a function of her social
preferences?
At the time of the referendum, all citizens who are selected by nature to
have the opportunity to vote may choose to vote for S, for R, or to abstain.
NS will denote the number of voters who actually vote for the status quo,
and NR for the reform. We assume that indifferent citizens always choose to
9See Venice Commission (2005) for the underpinnings of the various existing rules. One
potential rationale for participation requirements, already mentioned in the introduction,
is the fear that the majority of voters could be insufficiently informed and insufficiently
motivated to express a preference for the status quo even though their total utility is
negatively affected by the reform, which is instead pushed through by an informed and
motivated minority.
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abstain.
Consider two existing electoral rules that constitute the most intuitive
voting game form candidates for implementation of social preferences PQSP
and AQSP respectively:
1. Under the participation quorum electoral rule (PQER), the outcome
of the election is R if and only if NS < NR and the total number of
non-abstaining citizens, NS +NR, is larger than the threshold qn.
2. Under the approval quorum electoral rule (AQER), the outcome of the
election is R if and only if NS < NR and NR is larger than the threshold
q̂n.
One would think that PQER should be the best rule to implement PQSP,
and AQER should be used to implement AQSP. Surprisingly, we will show
that this intuitive connection is false, and in fact AQER “dominates” PQER,
in a sense to be clarified below, even when social preferences are PQSP.
2.3 Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
Citizens know θS and θR but they are uncertain about the exact population
of actual voters. For all population parameters, a strategy is a choice of
voting behavior for each of the two types of citizens with strict preferences
(given that indifferent citizens are assumed to abstain). We assume everyone
maximizes expected utility, and we look for stable (with respect to small
perturbations of the strategies10) Bayesian Nash equilibria involving non-
dominated strategies for sufficiently large n.11
3 Analysis
We begin by studying the citizens’ best response functions and the resulting
equilibria for each of the two voting game forms described above.
10It is the same stability requirement as in, for instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996). When there are three equilibria, this stability requirement rules out the interme-
diate equilibrium, as any perturbation of the expectations of other players’ behavior make
all agents shift towards the strategies that form one of the other two equilibria (which, of
course, are stable in that sense).
11Given that we have an unbounded number of potential players, describing individual
strategies and considering asymmetric equilibria would be complex. In the symmetric
equilibrium that we select all agents of any given type use the same voting strategy.
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The two game forms share a few characteristics. Voting for R (resp., for
S) is a weakly dominated strategy for citizens preferring S (resp., R). There-
fore, such citizens only consider abstaining versus voting for their preferred
outcome.
Let any citizen who prefers S decide to actually vote with probability σ.
Then, the total number of votes for S is a Poisson of mean σθSn, that is,
Prob(NS = k) =
e−σθ
Sn(σθSn)k
k!
.
3.1 AQER game form
The difference in expected utility between voting for one’s preferred outcome
and abstaining comes from the probability of being pivotal. The key obser-
vation for a citizen preferring S (resp., R) is that the only possibility for her
to affect the outcome of the election is making it switch from R to S (resp.,
from S to R), and these possibilities occur with probability
Prob(NS = NR − 1 and NR ≥ q̂n)
(resp.,
Prob(NS = NR and NR ≥ q̂n− 1)).
There is no swing voter’s curse in such elections. Hence, the expected util-
ity derived from voting for one’s preferred outcome is either zero or strictly
positive, as the probabilities above are either zero or strictly positive. Ab-
staining is then a weakly dominated strategy. As a result, a sincere profile,
with every voter voting for her preferred outcome if she is called by nature to
vote, is a stable Bayesian Nash equilibrium involving undominated strategies.
Given population uncertainty, it could happen that θSn > θRn > q̂n
whereas NR > NS > q̂n, so that the reform is passed when the planner
strictly prefers the status quo. The most likely event, however, is that the
planner’s preferences are satisfied. Let us remember that as n becomes ar-
bitrarily large, all the mass of probability is concentrated arbitrarily close to
the most likely event. Therefore, as n goes to infinity, the standard deviation
around the mean,
√
θSn is arbitrarily small compared to the mean, and NS
(resp., NR) is arbitrarily close to θSn (resp., θRn) and the optimal outcome
is implemented with a probability tending to 1.
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3.2 PQER game form
Under PQER, citizens who prefer the reform can never influence the outcome
in their favor by abstaining, hence abstaining is a weakly dominated strategy
for them. All those citizens vote for R if they happen to vote.
For agents who prefer the status quo, on the other hand, there is the
following strategic voting problem: adding one vote in favor of the status
quo may change the outcome of the election from the status quo to the
reform if this vote is pivotal in reaching the quorum and the reform has
the majority of votes. On the other hand, adding one vote in favor of the
status quo may also be pivotal for the status quo, if the quorum is already
reached and the reform is one vote ahead of the status quo. Consequently,
the expected utility of voting for S instead of abstaining depends on
Prob(NS = NR − 1 and NS +NR ≥ qn)
− Prob(NS < NR − 1 and NS +NR = qn− 1),
where NR is Poisson distributed with mean θRn.
Let us consider a citizen who prefers S. If all other citizens of her type
have decided to abstain, then Prob(NS = NR − 1 and NS + NR ≥ qn) = 0
whereas the other probability is strictly positive. This proves that abstaining
is not weakly dominated. Consequently, finding an equilibrium amounts
to finding the equilibrium value of the probability σ with which citizens
preferring S actually vote for S. From what has already been said, we can
derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under the participation quorum electoral rules, for all θS, θR, the
participation game admits an equilibrium where σ = 0, that is, where all
citizens preferring the status quo abstain.
Proof : Let θS, θR be given. Assume all citizens of type S (those who strictly
prefer the status quo) but one choose σ = 0. Then, for all n ∈ N,
Prob(NS = NR − 1 and NS +NR ≥ qn) = 0,
whereas
Prob(NS < NR − 1 and NS +NR = qn− 1)
= Prob(NR = qn− 1) = e
−θRn(θRn)qn−1
(qn− 1)! > 0,
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so that for all n ∈ N: σ = 0 is a best response, proving the claim. 
Equipped with this lemma, we are now able to characterize the set of
outcomes that, as a function of the parameters θS, θR of the population, are
supported by an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Under the participation quorum electoral rules, the set of electoral
outcomes supported by an equilibrium is the function of the parameters θS, θR
illustrated below.
Proof : See the appendix. 
This result reveals that there are two regions of parameters where the
set of possible electoral outcomes does not coincide with what the planner
would have chosen, had she known the preferences of the electorate. The
first region (region 3 in the proof, where θR < q, θR > θS, and θR + θS > q)
is composed of the populations where the defenders of the reform are more
numerous than the defenders of the status quo, but are not sufficient, by
themselves, to reach the quorum. By abstaining, therefore, the defenders of
the status quo succeed in preventing the reform from being voted. That is
the already known effect of participation quorums, the Italian story. Observe
that the undesired equilibrium is the only one for a large subset of parameters
in this region.
There is a second region of parameters with an undesirable outcome (re-
gion 6 in the proof, where θS > θR > q): when supporters of the status
quo are more numerous than the defenders of the reform, but the latter are
sufficiently numerous to reach the quorum by themselves, there exists an equi-
librium where all citizens preferring the status quo abstain, but the quorum
is reached and the reform passes. Population uncertainty is the crucial ingre-
dient yielding this result. It is indeed rational for status quo supporters to
abstain, because, given the uncertainty about the actual voting population,
the probability of being pivotal in favor of the reform by making the number
of voters reach the quorum, even if the quorum is expected to be reached, is
larger than the probability of being pivotal in favor of the status quo. The
consequence is that the reform is passed, whereas sincere voting would have
confirmed society’s preference towards the status quo, in an electoral system
protecting it.
12
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Figure 3: The possible electoral outcomes under a q−participation quorum
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In terms of plausibility of the “bad” equilibria we identified, the general
abstention of region 6 by supporters of the status quo when the expected
number of voters in favor of the reform is largely above the quorum is less
plausible than general participation. But when the expected number of vot-
ers in favor of the reform is only slightly above the quorum, then it seems
extremely plausible that supporters of the status quo try to enforce it by
abstaining.
4 Main Comparative Result
Figure 1 tells us what the electoral designer exhibiting participation quorum
social preferences would decide if she were completely informed about the cit-
izens’ preferences. Figure 3 tells us what this planner actually implements by
introducing a participation quorum. As pointed out in the previous section,
the two figures do not coincide. Figure 2 tells us what this planner would
have implemented had she introduced an approval quorum in the electoral
system. Here comes our central result: the set of population parameters
for which the outcome of the elections coincides with the preference of the
planner is larger under an approval than under a participation quorum.
Before we prove this claim formally, we remark that we take a point of
view of full implementation (all equilibrium outcomes should be socially op-
timal) as opposed to partial implementation (there should exist at least one
equilibrium supporting the socially optimal outcome). The intuitive moti-
vation for this is that an electoral designer who exhibits some risk aversion
wishes to avoid to have an electoral outcome that does not fit her social pref-
erences when this can be avoided by choosing a set of rules that eliminates
the possibility of bad equilibria.
Theorem 1 The set of population parameters θS, θR for which the outcome
of the election coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences
is larger under a qˆ-approval quorum electoral rule with qˆ = q than under a
q-participation quorum electoral rule.
Proof : Let q denote the value of the parameter describing the planner’s
q-participation quorum social preferences. The following statements follow
from Lemma 2 and the fact that citizens have a dominant strategy to vote
sincerely in approval quorum elections:
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1) If
either θS ≤ θR, and θR ≥ q,
or θS + θR ≤ q
or θS + θR ≥ q, θS ≥ θR and θR ≤ q,
then the outcome of the elections under either a q-participation or a qˆ-
approval quorum with qˆ = q coincides with the q-participation quorum social
preferences;
2) If
θS + θR ≥ q,
θS ≤ θR, and
θR ≤ q,
then neither the outcome of the elections under a q-participation nor a qˆ-
approval quorum with qˆ = q coincides with the q-participation quorum social
preferences;
3) If
θS ≥ θR, and
θR ≥ q,
then the outcome of the elections under a qˆ-approval quorum with qˆ = q, that
is, R, coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences, whereas
the outcome of the elections under a q-participation quorum does not (as it
is either R or S). 
As a consequence, independently of whether the planner has participation
or approval quorum social preferences, she should introduce approval quorum
in the electoral rules.
The above theorem is based on the existence of regions of population
parameters in which the set of outcomes of the participation quorum elections
differs from the set of outcomes that are preferred by participation quorum
social preferences. In one of these regions, region 6 in the proof of lemma 2
and case 3 in the proof of Theorem 1, there are equilibria that support the
correct outcome, the status quo, but there are other equilibria supporting the
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undesired outcome, the reform, whereas all the equilibria under the approval
quorum voting game support the correct outcome. A planner that would be
satisfied whenever her preferred outcome is supported by some equilibrium
could be fine with participation quorums. If, on the contrary, she demands
her preferred outcome to be supported by all equilibria, then she should
prefer approval quorum.
The third case analyzed in the proof of the theorem corresponds to a
region of parameters (recall that it is region 6 in the proof of Lemma 2)
that disappears when q = 0.5 (if θR ≥ q = 0.5, then it is impossible to have
θS ≥ θR). Hence with q = 0.5 the two types of quorum rules are equivalent in
terms of implementation of PQSP. In all other cases a participation quorum
is strictly dominated ex ante by setting an approval quorum with the same
threshold.
5 Extensions
5.1 Supermajority
The starting assumption of our paper is that the social planner wishes to
protect the status quo. We have considered only quorum rules as instruments
for this goal. An immediate extension consists in assuming that, in addition
to the quorum, the planner imposes a supermajority for the reform to pass.
Let us assume that the reform is approved only if the participation quorum is
reached and the reform receives m times more votes than the status quo. By
voting for S, a citizen is now pivotal in favor of S if NS = int(mNR)−1 and
NS + NR ≥ qn, where int(x) denotes the integer value of x. She is pivotal
in favor of R if NS < int(mNR) − 1 and NS + NR = qn − 1. The analysis
carries over without any surprise, and a similar lemma as lemma 2 is easily
obtained, illustrated by a graph similar to the one of Figure 3 except that
the forty five degree line is replaced with a line of slope m.
5.2 Cost of voting
In the model of the previous section, supporters of the reform have a dom-
inant strategy to vote for the reform. This is, of course, a simplification.
With positive voting costs for some voters, turnout is obviously affected. We
did not include them in the analysis so far, because it is not clear how the
16
normative analysis we have developed should take them into account. How-
ever, it is interesting to look at how the equilibria we have identified survive
under the assumption that voting costs may be positive. To introduce voting
costs, voters’ utility should be redefined as depending on the outcome j of
the voting, j ∈ {R, S}, and on the cost, c,
uic = ui(j)− c
where i ∈ {R, S} is the type of the voter, so that ui(j) = 1 whenever i = j and
ui(j) = 0 whenever i 6= j and c is distributed on some interval [c, c] such that
c ≤ 0 < c. The size of the voting population remains Poisson distributed,
and each agent called by nature to vote is characterized by a type i ∈ {R, S}
and a voting cost c ∼ F [c, c], where F denotes the distribution function of c.
It is clear that a new type of equilibrium arises, the equilibrium in which
all voters abstain. We already know that abstention may be the best strat-
egy for all supporters of the status quo. It becomes a best response of the
supporters of the reform in two cases. The first case is when θR < q. If some
supporters of the reform find the probability of being pivotal too small com-
pared to their voting cost, they will decide to abstain. This will decrease the
expected fraction of voters in favor of R below θR, which, in turn, decreases
the probability of being pivotal even further. Consequently, more voters will
decide to stay home. For some distribution function F , this will result in all
supporters of R abstaining.
The second case is when θR > q. Assume all supporters of the status quo
abstain. The supporters of the reform who have the highest voting cost will
decide to abstain as well. Contrary to the previous case, this increases the
probability of being pivotal. This probability is maximized when the fraction
σ of voters of type R is such that σθR = q. In that case, the probability of
being pivotal, as a function of the expected size of the voting population n,
is equal to
p =
e−σθ
Rn(σθRn)σθ
Rn
σθRn!
.
No more than a fraction F(p) of voters of type R vote in that case. If
F(p) < q
θR
, σ = q
θR
is not an equilibrium: more voters will decide to stay
home, with the consequence that the probability to be pivotal will decrease.
Again, there are values of F for which abstaining is the only best response
to abstaining.
Let us assume that if θR < q, then F(p) > q
θR
. The other equilibria we
identified in the previous section remain possible under that assumption. We
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don’t think it is possible to characterize them algebraically.12 A clear point
to make, however, is that voting costs may only make abstention more ben-
eficial. The problematic equilibria we find with voters of type S abstaining
and the equilibrium outcome being S when the planner would have preferred
R and R when the planner would have preferred S remain and are even more
likely to take place. Again, the only difference between the two types of quo-
rum systems is that approval quorum does not give incentive to supporters
of the status quo to abstain. Voting costs, in summary, do not change the
picture.
5.3 Uncertain Preferences Aggregation
All the analysis so far rests on the assumption that there is no uncertainty
about the distribution of preferences. There are two cases of preference un-
certainty, depending on whether voters know their own preference or not. We
study the former case in this subsection, and the latter case in the following
one.
Let us assume that parameters θR and θS are random parameters, dis-
tributed according to density function F (θR, θS). At the time of the ballot,
each citizen knows her type, but does not know the precise value of θR and
θS. The analysis of this case turns out to be very similar to the one of the
previous sections.
Let us begin with PQER. It remains a dominant strategy for a citizen
preferring the reform to go to vote and to vote for the reform. We only need
to determine the equilibrium strategy of citizens preferring the status quo.
Such a citizen will either vote for the reform or abstain. Let σ determine
the probability that the other citizens preferring the status quo vote for the
status quo. Remember that we are interested in what happens for sufficiently
large population. To compute her best response, a citizen needs to maximize
her expected utility conditionally on her vote being pivotal. It is well known
that this is equivalent to maximize her expected utility conditionally on the
specific most likely event in which her vote is pivotal (see, for instance, the
12Castanheira (2003) succeeds in characterizing the equilibria in a model with Poisson
uncertainty and voting costs. A key step in his result is the explicit derivation of the
probability of being pivotal. The same strategy cannot be applied here, because the modi-
fied Bessel function that Castanheira uses cannot be used to compute pivotal probabilities
when the pivotal event depends on the sum of votes for two alternatives, as it is the case
with quorums.
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Magnitude Theorem in Myerson (2000)). In the setting of this subsection,
this requires computing the specific values of θR and θS that maximize the
probability of a tie event.
For sufficiently large n, the most likely specific tie event in which this
citizen is pivotal in favor of the reform occurs when θR +σθS = q, θR ≥ σθS,
and
NR = θRn
NS = σθSn.
Indeed, the parameter of a Poisson distribution (that is, θRn for the distri-
bution of NR and σθSn for the distribution of NS) is also the mode of the
distribution.
For the same reason, the most likely specific tie event in which this citizen
is pivotal in favor of the status quo occurs when θR + σθS ≥ q, θR = σθS,
and
NR = θRn
NS = σθSn.
A citizen wishing to maximize her expected utility will therefore choose
her strategy as a function of which of those two events is more likely. In
case the former is more likely, the citizen will abstain. In the opposite case,
she will vote for the status quo. If the two probabilities are the same, she is
indifferent between abstaining and voting, but, for the same reason as in the
previous section, an equilibrium of that kind would not be stable.
Assume σ = 0. Exactly like in the previous section, the only possible
pivotal events are those in which that voter is pivotal in favor of the reform.
Abstaining is therefore always an equilibrium, even if the ex ante expected
value of θR is larger than q (and the ex ante expected outcome is that the
reform is passed).
Abstaining is the unique best response to voting for the status quo if and
only if
max
q
2
≤θ≤q
F (θ, q − θ) > max
q
2
≤θ
F (θ, θ).
For all voting games in which density function F satisfies this inequality,
abstaining is the only equilibrium. For all the other games, there are two
equilibria, one in which all citizens preferring the status quo abstain, and one
in which they all vote for the status quo.
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The analysis of the AQER is immediate. The uncertainty about the
preferences of the other agents does not affect the behavior of the voters.
It remains a dominant strategy of all non-indifferent voters to vote for the
alternative they prefer.
In conclusion, our results extend to the case of uncertainty about the
preferences of the others, even if they take a different shape. For some prior
beliefs on the population parameters, abstention by the supporters of the
status quo is the unique equilibrium. For the other prior beliefs, there are
two equilibria, one in which all those voters abstain, one in which they all
vote for the status quo. As a consequence, we still obtain the result that, ex
post, the status quo is kept even if the social planner would have preferred to
move to the reform, and the opposite result that the reform is passed whereas
the social planner would have preferred to keep the status quo. This cannot
happen with approval quorum, so that the AQER ex post implements the
AQSP, and does better in terms of ex post implementing PQSP than the
PQER.
5.4 Information Aggregation
It is rather natural to think that the partisans of the reform, who have had
the time to study the issue and compute their costs and benefits, know their
preferences with certainty, but it is not clear whether all the other agents
know what is in their best interest. Moreover, we can even think that some
citizens may be convinced that the decision will affect their welfare but may
be uncertain about the direction of change in their welfare. In this section
we show that, in this case as well, an approval quorum voting rule is better
than a participation one, for exactly the same reasons as above.
We change the model in the following manner: there is a fraction θR of
partisans of the reform, and a fraction θI of independent citizens, θR+θI ≤ 1.
The others are indifferent between the status quo and the reform. We assume
that they abstain. Independent citizens have the same preferences: they
prefer the reform in state r, and the status quo in state s. The two states of
nature have prior probability pir and pis respectively, pir+pis = 1. Among the
independent citizens, a fraction γ are informed about the state of nature, but
the remaining (1−γ) do not receive any information. All these parameters are
common knowledge. This model is an extension of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996)’s model.
The two social preferences now depend on the state of nature. They are
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described in the following figures. According to the q−participation quorum
social preferences, in state r the reform should be the outcome, except if
less than q percent of the population are concerned by the issue. In state
s, the outcome should be the same as in the previous section. According
to the q̂−approval quorum social preferences, in state r the reform should
be the outcome except if less than q̂ percent of the population is supporting
the reform, exactly like with the other social preferences. In state s, the
outcome should be the same as in the previous section. Following Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996), we now consider that elections aggregate information
rather than preferences. We say that information aggregation is efficient if
the outcome of the election is the one that the planner would have chosen
had he known the true state of nature.
-
θI
6θ
R
1
1
q
q
(S, S)
(S, S)
(R,R)
(R, S)
Figure 4: The q−participation quorum social preferences, as a function of
the state of nature
Let us analyze the approval quorum game first. Partisans of the reform
have, as before, a dominant strategy to vote for the reform. Informed inde-
pendent citizens can condition their vote on the state of nature, which they
observe. In state r, they can only gain by voting for R, and in state s they
can only gain by voting for S (abstaining is a weakly dominated strategy).
Their dominant strategy is therefore (R, S), which reads: vote for R in r, for
S in s.
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Figure 5: The q̂−approval quorum social preferences, as a function of the
state of nature
The situation is different for uninformed independent citizens. They have
to choose how to vote without knowing the state. On the other hand, they
know that informed citizens vote as a function of their information, so that
the uninformed citizens’ strategy should consist in maximising the probability
that informed citizens be pivotal. Their dilemma is that their vote for R can
be needed in state r if partisans and informed citizens are not sufficient to
meet the quorum, but their vote for S can be needed in state s if the informed
citizens are not sufficient to out-balance the partisans, in case these ones reach
the threshold.
Let σR and σS denote the probability that an uninformed independent
citizen votes for the reform and the status quo, respectively. In state r, the
expected fraction of the population voting for R is λR|r = θR + (σR(1 −
γ) + γ)θI , whereas a fraction λS|r = σS(1 − γ)θI is expected to vote for S.
Similarly, λR|s = θR + σR(1− γ)θI , and λS|s = (σS(1− γ) + γ)θI . Let us call
Piv1 the event that a vote for S makes the outcome of the election change
from R to S, and Piv2 the event that a vote for R leads the quorum to be
reached and the outcome to change from S to R, that is (assuming qn is an
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integer),
Prob(Piv1) =
∞∑
qn
Prob(NS = k − 1 and NR = k),
and
Prob(Piv2) =
qn−1∑
k=0
Prob(NS = k and NR = qn− 1).
From the analysis and the comparison of these crucial events, we can show
that approval quorum rules determine no information inefficiency:
Lemma 3 Under the approval quorum electoral rule, the outcome of the elec-
tion coincides with the approval quorum social preferences for all population
θI , θR.
Proof : See the Appendix. 
Rational voting under an approval quorum voting rule is not as sim-
ple with preference uncertainty as without. But the lemma proves that an
approval quorum surprisingly does not prevent efficient information aggre-
gation: the outcome is always the same as what it would be if uninformed
independent citizens were actually informed.
Here is the intuition of this result. Given that there is no way of making
a mistake under approval quorum when a citizen knows her preferences, the
partisans of the reform have a dominant strategy to vote for it (as previously)
and the informed independent citizens to vote for R in r and S in s. The
only delicate question is for the uninformed independent citizens.
Let us illustrate their optimal strategy numerically.13 Assume q̂ = 0.20,
θR = 0.10, γθI = 0.05 and (1− γ)θR=0.40. The dilemma of the uninformed
independents is that they should vote for R in r, as the other voters are not
numerous enough to make R reach the quorum, but they should not vote
“too much” for R, as they still like S better in state s. This is achieved, for
instance, if they choose the following mixed strategy: with probability 0.20,
they vote for R, otherwise they abstain. As a result, R is expected to obtain
(10+5+0.20*40=) 23% of votes in r, so that the quorum is reached, and only
(10+0.20*40=) 18% in s, which guarantees the election of S.
13All the percentage of votes in these examples are expressed as ratios of the expected
total number of potential voters in the population, n.
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Assume now that q̂ = 0.20, θR = 0.25, γθI = 0.05 and (1 − γ)θR=0.40.
The dilemma is now that they need to vote for S, otherwise R is likely to
be elected in s, but if too many independent citizens vote for S, R could
fail to be elected in r. The optimal strategy looks like this: with probability
0.625, they vote for S, otherwise they abstain. As a result, R is expected
to receive (25+5=) 30% of votes, and S (0.625*40=) 25%, in r, and the
expected outcome is reversed in s, the desired outcome. As a result, the
outcome always coincides with the planner’s preferred candidate.
This will no longer be the case with the participation quorum, as can be
appreciated from the next theorem.
Theorem 2 The set of population parameters for which the outcome of the
election coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences is larger
under a qˆ-approval quorum with qˆ = q than a q-participation quorum even
when independent citizens’ preferences depend on an uncertain state of Na-
ture.
Proof : See the Appendix. 
Again, let us illustrate the reasoning numerically. First, there is a region
of parameters where S is elected in s whereas the planner prefers R. Assume
that q = 0.20, θR = 0.15, γθI = 0.03 and (1 − γ)θI=0.06. What is the best
strategy of the informed independents? Let us begin by assuming that all
the uninformed independents vote for S. Then, the quorum is expected to
be reached in both states of nature, because at least (15+6=) 21% of the
voters vote. Without the vote of informed independents, R is expected to
win in both cases. In r, there is no ambiguity, informed citizens vote for
R. In s, however, given the large victory margin of R over S (15% over
6%), whereas the quorum is not passed by much, the most likely tie is that
an additional vote makes the quorum be reached. Consequently, informed
independents decide to abstain in s. Knowing that, it is not rational for
the uninformed independents to vote for S with certainty. By voting for S
with only, say, 0.67% of probability, they guarantee that R is elected in r (the
quorum is likely to be reached, as (15+3+0.67*6=) 22% of citizens show up),
and, simultaneously, they keep the probability that the quorum is reached in
s sufficiently low, as only 19% of the citizens are expected to participate.
Second, there is a region where R is elected in s whereas the planner
prefers S. Assume that q = 0.20, θR = 0.22, γθI = 0.05 and (1− γ)θR=0.40.
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As above, it is likely that informed citizens decide to vote for R in r and
abstain in s. This is especially made rational if all uninformed citizens decide
to abstain. They all know, indeed, that R is expected to win in r, as it obtains
27% of votes. Abstention is rational even in s, though, as the most likely tie
is that an additional vote makes the quorum be reached.
These two regions of parameters are similar to the ones identified in the
previous section. In each of them an undesired equilibrium exists, supporting
the outcome that the planner would like to avoid.
6 Concluding remarks
We have proven that approval quorums, by giving citizens the incentive to
vote sincerely, protect the status quo in a better way than participation quo-
rums even if the preferences of the planner are consistent with what sincere
voting would yield under participation quorums. Whether the objective of
elections is to aggregate preferences or to aggregate information, we have
shown that the result is unchanged.
Our dominance result is strict when the participation quorum is less than
50 percent. In such cases (Azerbaijan has a 25% participation quorum) the
policy conclusion of this paper is clear: switch towards an approval quorum.
However, even if the alternative is a participation quorum greater than or
equal than 50 percent, the weak dominance should, in our view, be considered
a strong enough argument to favor approval quorum rules, given that it
is unlikely that everybody will always share the view that the appropriate
legitimacy concern should be the one embedded in participation quorum
social preferences.
Our starting point was that protecting the status quo is a common ob-
jective for the electoral designer. However, we have simply assumed such
an objective, without trying to derive it endogenously. Also, the paper does
not design the electoral rules that would implement the participation quo-
rum social preferences fully (AQER does better at that than PQER, but
without achieving full implementation of PQSP). Finally, voters’ preferences
are exogenous in this paper. That is, we did not consider the possibility
that lobbyists or opinion leaders could design the initiative in such a way
to maximize the chance of winning. Modeling this step in a two-stage game
raises technical problems, due to the difficulty in computing the magnitude
of pivotal events in the presence of a participation quorum.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let us begin with a complete description of the best reply correspondence
of a citizen of type S. For this exercise, let θSn denote the expected size of
the population of other citizens of type S. Let us assume that the symmetric
strategy of these other citizens is σ, so that the number of actual votes in
favor of S, NS, is Poisson distributed with mean σθSn. We already know
that the number of actual votes in favor of R, NR, is Poisson distributed
with mean θRn. By voting for S, a citizen can be pivotal in favor of S if
NS = NR − 1 and NS + NR ≥ qn, and she may be pivotal in favor of R if
NS < NR − 1 and NS + NR = qn − 1. Let us refer to the former case as
Piv1, and to the latter as Piv2. We have
Prob(Piv1) =
∞∑
k=int( qn2 )
Prob(NS = k and NR = k + 1)
=
∞∑
k=int( qn2 )
e−σθ
Sn(σθSn)k
k!
e−θ
Rn(θRn)k+1
(k + 1)!
and
Prob(Piv2) =
int( qn−12 )−1∑
k=0
Prob(NS = k and NR = qn− k − 1)
=
int( qn−12 )−1∑
k=0
e−σθ
Sn(σθSn)k
k!
e−θ
Rn(θRn)qn−k−1
(qn− k − 1)!
where int(x) stands for the integer value of x. We look at equilibrium for n
sufficiently large. As n becomes larger, the probabilities of Piv1 and Piv2
tend to 0. Let µ1, µ2 denote the magnitude of these events, that is, the speed
at which they tend to zero, that is, for i ∈ {1, 2},
µi = lim
n→∞
ln(Prob(Pivi))
n
.
The event with the largest magnitude will necessarily be more likely than
the other one for n sufficiently large (that is precisely the meaning of n being
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sufficiently large). Let us compute these magnitudes. Using Theorem 1 in
Myerson (2000), we know that the magnitude of such an event is identical to
the magnitude of the most likely subevent, that is, of the exact sequence of
numbers NS = k and NR = k + 1 that maximizes
σθSψ
(
k
σθSn
)
+ θRψ
(
k + 1
θRn
)
under the constraint that k ≥ int ( qn
2
)
, and the exact sequence of numbers
NS = k and NR = qn− k − 1 that maximizes
σθSψ
(
k
σθSn
)
+ θRψ
(
qn− k − 1
θRn
)
under the constraint that k ≤ int ( qn−1
2
) − 1, respectively, where ψ(x) =
x(1 − lnx) − 1. Let k1 and k2 denote the arguments maximizing the above
expressions, respectively. Simple derivation leads to
k1 = max
{
int
(qn
2
)
,
√
1
4
+ σθSθRn2 − 1
2
}
,
and
k2 = min
{
int
(
qn− 1
2
)
− 1, σθ
S
σθS + θR
(qn− 1)
}
.
Observe that the second critical value of k1 can be approximated by its limit
value
√
σθSθRn. In the case where
√
σθSθR ≤ q
2
, k1 tends towards its first
critical value qn
2
, assuming qn
2
is an integer. Event Piv1, that is, a tie between
R and S, is more likely for values NS = qn
2
− 1 and NR = qn
2
. We compute
that
µ1 = lim
n→∞
n−1 ln
(
e−σθ
Sn(σθSn)
qn
2
−1
( qn
2
− 1)!
e−θ
Rn(θRn)
qn
2
( qn
2
)!
)
= lim
n→∞
n−1 ln
(
e−(σθ
S+θR)n(σθSθRn2)
qn
2(
( qn
2
)!
)2 q2σθS
)
,
which, using the Stirling formula (according to which k! can be approximated
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by
√
2pik
(
k
e
)k
), yields
µ1 = lim
n→∞
n−1 ln
(
e−(σθ
S+θR−q)n
piqn
(
4σθSθRn2
(qn)2
) qn
2 q
2σθS
)
,
= lim
n→∞
−(σθS + θR − q) + q
2
ln
4σθSθR
q2
− lnpiqn
n
+
ln q
2σθS
n
,
which gives
µ1 = q − q ln q + q ln 2
√
σθSθR − (σθS + θR). (1)
Similar computations lead to the following magnitude equations. If
√
σθSθR >
q
2
, k1 tends towards its second critical value, n
√
σθSθR, and
µ1 = 2
√
σθSθR − (σθS + θR). (2)
If k2 tends to
qn
2
− 1, then
µ2 = q − q ln q + q ln 2
√
σθSθR − (σθS + θR). (3)
If k2 tends to
σθSqn
σθS+θR
, then
µ2 = q − q ln q + q ln(σθS + θR)− (σθS + θR). (4)
Region 1. θS < θR and θS + θR < q. In this region, k1 tends to
qn
2
and
k2 tends to
σθSqn
σθS+θR
. Consequently, µ1 < µ2 (as the geometric mean√
σθSθR is always smaller than the arithmetic mean σθ
S+θR
2
). Indepen-
dently of σ, a citizen has incentive to abstain. The only equilibrium,
therefore, is σ = 0, and the expected outcome is S.
Region 2. θS ≥ θR and θS + θR < q: in this region, k1 tends to qn2 , and k2
tends to either value. If it tends to σθ
Sqn
σθS+θR
, then the same reasoning as
above holds, and σ = 0 is the only equilibrium. If it tends to qn
2
− 1,
then µ1 = µ2. The probabilities of Piv1 and Piv2 tend to zero at the
same speed, but that does not mean that they are equal. Actually,
the most likely subevent of Piv1 and Piv2 are when NS = NR − 1 =
int( qn
2
) and NS = int( qn+1
2
)−2, NR = int( qn
2
)+1 respectively. In both
cases, NR takes the same value, so that Prob(Piv1) > Prob(Piv2) ⇔
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Prob(NS = int( qn
2
)) > Prob(NS = int( qn+1
2
) − 2). Consequently,
Prob(Piv1) > Prob(Piv2) ⇔ σθSn > qn
2
− 1. That shows that there
is an equilibrium with σ = qn−2
2θSn
. But this equilibrium is unstable: for
any slight decrease (resp., increase) in σ, µ1 < µ2 (resp., µ1 > µ2) and
abstaining (resp., voting for S) is a best reply. So we have two stable
symmetric equilibria in this region, namely σ = 0 and σ = 1. In both
cases, the expected outcome is S, as the number of voters in favor of
R is expected to be below the quorum, and the total expected number
of votes for S if all S supporters vote for S is larger than the expected
number of votes for R.
Region 3. θS < θR < q < θS + θR: in this region, k2 tends to
σθSqn
σθS+θR
. If√
σθSθR < q
2
, then k1 tends to
qn
2
and µ1 < µ2 and a citizen maximizes
her utility by abstaining. If
√
σθSθR ≥ q
2
, then k1 tends to n
√
σθSθR.
We may, again, have a mixed strategy equilibrium with µ1 = µ2 and
2
√
σθSθR = q − q ln q + q ln(σθS + θR).
But, again, such an equilibrium cannot be stable. Indeed,
∂(µ1 − µ2)
∂σ
=
√
θSθR
σ
− qθ
S
σθS + θR
,
and, as q < 2
√
σθSθR, we can deduce, by replacing q with its upper
bound,
∂(µ1 − µ2)
∂σ
>
√
θSθR
σ
θR − σθS
σθS + θR
> 0,
where the last inequality comes from θS < θR and σ ≤ 1. So, only
σ = 0 and σ = 1 are equilibrium candidates. If σ = 0, then µ1 < µ2
and abstaining is an equilibrium in the whole region, with outcome
S. If σ = 1, then µ1 > µ2 if and only if
√
θSθR ≥ q
2
and 2
√
θSθR >
q − q ln q + q ln(θS + θR). In this subregion, voting for S is also an
equilibrium, and the expected outcome is R. To sum up, in this region,
where the planner always prefers R, there is always an equilibrium with
outcome S and in one subregion it is the only equilibrium outcome.
Region 4. θS > θR, θR < q < θS + θR: in this region, both k1 and k2 can
converge towards any of their respective values. By the same argument
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as above, we can prove that there are two equilibria, σ = 0 and σ = 1,
but the expected outcomes associated to these equilibria are both S,
as either the quorum is not reached in equilibrium (if all S supporters
abstain) or S gets more votes than R (if all S supporters actually vote).
There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium, which, for the same reason
as above, is unstable.
Region 5. θS < θR and θR > q: independently of the optimal strategy of
citizens of type S, the expected outcome is R, as citizens of type R are
numerous enough to reach the quorum and they are more numerous
than citizens of type S.
Region 6. θS > θR > q. Let us look immediately at the two extreme
equilibrium candidates, σ = 0 and σ = 1. In the former case, k1 and
k2 converge towards
qn
2
and 0 respectively, so that unambiguously µ1 <
µ2, and abstaining is a best reply. This is, therefore, an equilibrium,
with expected outcome R, as θRn > qn. This is the most surprising
equilibrium of this game form. The reform is passed, whereas more
citizens strictly prefer S to R than R to S. If σ = 1, then k1 and k2
converge to n
√
θSθR and qn
2
−1 respectively. Then, µ1 > µ2 if and only
if
2
√
σθSθR − q + q ln q − q ln(σθS + θR) > 0,
but this is always the case, as the inequality holds for θS = θR = q (the
smallests values of these parameters in region 6) and the expression is
increasing in both θS and θR. This proves that σ = 1 is an equilibrium,
and the equilibrium outcome is S.
Proof of lemma ??: The same kind of computations as in the above proof
reveal that in state i ∈ {r, s} if
√
λR|iλS|i ≥ q, then the most likely subevent
of Piv1 occurs when k tends to
√
λR|iλS|in, and
µ1|i = 2
√
λR|iλS|i − (λR|i + λS|i), (5)
whereas, if
√
λR|iλS|i ≤ q, then the most likely subevent of Piv1 occurs when
k tends to qn, and
µ1|i = 2q − 2q ln q + q lnλR|iλS|i − (λR|i + λS|i). (6)
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If λS|i ≤ q, then the most likely subevent of Piv2 occurs when k tends to
λS|in (its most likely value), and
µ2|i = q − q ln q + q lnλR|i − λR|i, (7)
whereas, if λS|i ≥ q, then the most likely subevent of Piv2 occurs when k
tends to qn− 1, and
µ2|i = 2q − 2q ln q + q lnλR|iλS|i − (λR|i + λS|i). (8)
Having computed the magnitudes, we prove first that it is impossible that
S wins in state r when θR + θI ≥ q. Note that this only happens if σR < 1.
We have to distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: λS|r ≥ λR|r ≥ q. That clearly requires σS > 0. Given the dominant
strategy of the informed independent citizens, we have λS|s > λS|r ≥ λR|r >
λR|s. Magnitude µ1|r is given by Eq. (??), µ2|r by Eq. (??). Proving that
µ1|r > µ2|r amounts to proving that
2
√
λR|rλS|r > 2q − 2q ln q + q lnλR|rλS|r,
or √
λR|rλS|r − q ln
√
λR|rλS|r > q − q ln q,
which follows from the fact that function x − q lnx is increasing for x > q.
Magnitude µ1|s may be given either by equation (??), in which case µ1|r >
µ1|s follows from λS|rλR|r > λS|sλR|s (remember that λS|r + λR|r = λS|s +
λR|s), or by (??), in which case µ1|r > µ1|s follows from the same argument
as for µ2|r above. Obviously, µ2|r > µ2|s, so that it is clear that µ1|r >
µ2|s. Consequently, conditional on her vote being pivotal, an uninformed
independent citizen is sure to be in state r, so that σS > 0 is not a best reply,
a contradiction.
Case 2: λR|r < q. Again, it is crucial that λS|s = λS|r + γθI , and λR|r =
λR|s+γθI . If λS|r is such that
√
λS|rλR|r ≥ q, then we are back to a case similar
to the one above, and σS > 0 cannot be a best reply. If q ≤ λS|r ≤ q2λR|r , then
µ1|r = µ2|r (given by Eqs. (??) and (??)). Magnitudes µ1|s and µ2|s are given
by the same Eqs., so that µ1|r > µ1|s, µ2|s follows from λS|rλR|r > λS|sλR|s. If
λS|r < q, then µ2|r is given by Eq. (??); µ2|r > µ2|s follows from λR|s < λR|r
and the fact that function x − q lnx is decreasing for x < q. The fact that
Piv1 are less likely than Piv2 is immediate and comes from the fact that
Piv1 occurs when the votes for R just reaches the quorum (same requirement
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as Piv2) and there is a tie between R and S. Consequently, conditional on
her vote being pivotal, an uninformed independent voter is sure to be in state
r, proving that σR < 1 is not a best reply, a contradiction. Note that this
also shows that if λR|r < q, the best reply is σS = 0: uninformed citizens
don’t vote for S, (but may vote for R), using the quorum as a guarantee that
S will win the election in s.
Second, we prove that it is impossible that R wins in state s when θR <
θI . That occurs if λR|s > q, λS|s, which implies that σS < 1. Note that
λR|r = λR|s + γθI > λR|s > q, so that clearly µ2|s > µ2|r. Also, λR|r > λR|s >
q, λS|s > λS|r makes it clear that µ1|s > µ1|r. Consequently (independently
on how Piv1 and Piv2 are ranked), state s is infinitely more likely than r
conditional on her vote being pivotal, so an uninformed independent citizen
votes for S, so that σS < 1 is not a best reply.
Proof of theorem ??:
Lemma ?? shows that a qˆ-approval quorum always gives the outcome
that coincides with the qˆ-approval social preferences. Consequently, in state
r, it also coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences, with
qˆ = q, as they are the same in that state. We simply need to show that
approval quorum does better than participation quorum in state s. Let us
restrict ourselves to proving that the undesired equilibria (leading to S being
chosen in Region 3 and R being chosen in Region 6) highlighted in Theorem
?? still prevails under the current assumptions.
Claim 1: an equilibrium exists such that S is elected in s, whereas θR < q,
θR > θI and θR + θI ≤ q. Let σ∗S ≥ 0 be defined by θR + σ∗S(1− γ)θI < q <
θR + (σ∗S(1− γ) + γ)θI , and
Prob(NR +NS = qn− 1|R) = Prob(NR +NS = qn− 1|S),
that is,
e−[θ
R+(σ∗S(1−γ)+γ)θI ]n([θR + (σ∗S(1− γ) + γ)θI ]n)qn−1
(qn− 1)!
=
e−[θ
R+(σ∗S(1−γ))θI ]n([θR + (σ∗S(1− γ))θI ]n)qn−1
(qn− 1)! ,
or,
e
−γθI
qn−1 [θR + (σ∗S(1− γ) + γ)θI ] = [θR + (σ∗S(1− γ))θI ]
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which yields
σ∗S =
θR
(1− γ)θI
1− γθIe−γθ
I
qn−1
θRe
−γθI
qn−1 − 1
.
We claim that informed independents playing (R, ∅), and the uninformed in-
dependents playing σ∗S is an equilibrium. By definition of σ
∗
S, Prob(Piv2|r) =
Prob(Piv2|s). Clearly, Prob(Piv1|i) < Prob(Piv2|i), all i ∈ {r, s}, as a Piv1
event requires a tie between R and S and that the quorum be reached. When
informed citizens observe the state is r, they clearly vote for R. When they
observe s, given that Prob(Piv1|s) < Prob(Piv2|s), they prefer abstaining.
Uninformed citizens do not observe the state. Conditional on their vote being
pivotal, they are sure that they face a Piv2 event, so that, as n→∞, they
tend to be indifferent between voting for S and abstaining. That equilibrium
is stable: if σS < σ
∗
S, (resp., σS > σ
∗
S) then Prob(Piv2|r) > Prob(Piv2|s)
(resp., Prob(Piv2|r) < Prob(Piv2|s)) so that citizens prefer voting for S
(resp. abstaining).
Claim 2: an equilibrium exists such that R is elected in s, whereas
θR < θI . Assume q < θR < θI . We claim that, like in the public infor-
mation framework of the previous sections, we have an equilibrium where
independent uninformed citizens prefer S but abstain, as voting for S could
make R win the election. Let us prove that informed independents playing
(R, ∅), and the uninformed independents playing ∅ is an equilibrium. As
λR|r = λR|s + γθI > λR|s > q and λS|r = λS|s = 0, we have µ2|s > µ2|r >
µ1|s, µ1|r. In state s, given that µ2|s > µ1|s, any independent citizen prefers to
abstain. As informed citizens observe the state of nature, voting for R in r
and abstaining in s is a best reply. Conditional on her vote being pivotal, an
uninformed independent citizen is sure to be in state s, so that abstaining is
her best reply.
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